Grotius, Risse and the Distributive Paradigm
The idea of humanity's original common ownership of the earthultimately of biblical origin -has a long pedigree in the history of political thought. While, starting with Aquinas, the notion was invoked by a large array of theorists from diverse traditions, it received its most systematic development in the work of early modern thinkers from Grotius to Like his 17 th century contemporaries, Grotius employs the notion of original common ownership in order to justify property rights and state boundaries, which he does by presenting them as the result of an (idealised) historical process that saw the division of an initially common stock. He starts with the assumption that God gave the earth to humans in common for the satisfaction of their needs (Grotius 2005 historical developments drawing on a number of philosophical, literary and theological sources, he does so against the assumption that the acknowledged facts of human history are not arbitrary or accidental, but necessary. Given that human nature so drastically constrains possible solutions to given problems that the particular outcomes can be seen to be inevitable, history reveals the logic of a distinctively human situation.
Grotius wants to show that history 'proofs the existence' (Grotius 2005: §40) of the independently valid laws of nature. In inferring the a priori from the a posteriori, the rational history of property becomes its justification -what happened ought to have happened.
The emergence of rights in property and territory figures as part of a wider account of the evolution of society. In the course of time, people start to grow discontent with a way of life that merely allows them 'to feed on the spontaneous product of the earth, to dwell in caves, to have the body either naked or clothed with the bark of trees or skins of wild animals' (Grotius 2005 : II.2.2.4). In the process of leaving this relatively simple life, they treat more and more objects as if they were bound up with their purposes of consumption and thus limited in re-usability. With this transition thus emerge more extended forms of exclusion and abstinence -the primitive form of use-right is no longer feasible (Salter 2001: 544 Risse's recent revival of the concept (Risse 2012 (Risse , 2013 (Risse , 2015 , which had fallen out of fashion in political philosophy for quite some while. The turn to Risse at this point is motivated by the observation that it is in his work that we see Grotius's notion of original common ownership explicitly employed as a fundamental conceptual pillar of a theory of global justice. 1 Notice that, quite strikingly, Grotius himself is not overly interested in questions of genuinely global concern, but in justifying particular property holdings and state boundaries. Risse instead explicitly identifies a 'universally acceptable, non-parochial standpoint' (Risse 2013: 22 ) in Grotius's needs-based framework, a standpoint he takes to be ideally suited to adjudicate an array of issues of global concern -including questions of resources, territory, immigration and environment. Very much in line with the sentiment of contemporary global justice debates, the need to theorise from such a standpoint is said to arise from a twofold empirical development: humanity is, in a globalised economy, increasingly interconnected, while at the same time confronting more and more problems that 'concern our way of dealing with the earth as a whole' (Risse 2015: 84 over a concern with intersubjective relations and structures, is wellrehearsed with regard to the domestic realm (see e.g. Anderson 1999 , Scheffler 2003 , Young 1990 : Ch.1). That it is less familiar from global justice debates is surprising, 4 given that precisely in this context it seems most urgent to attend to those issues that may emanate from substantial inequalities of control over biophysical space and resources, but at their core are, and need to be theorised qua, deplorable social relations of domination and exploitation that they give rise to. The worry is that the distributive paradigm is not only oblivious to the power relations underlying a particular allocations of goods, but also profoundly unpolitical:
rather than treating individuals as agents of justice with the authority to raise claims and the capacity to create mutually justifiable relations, it tends to view them as passive recipients of goods.
In the Grotian framework this tendency is reflected in a notion of land. For instance, if a country is 'underusing' the natural resources located on its territory -i.e. its inhabitants have access to more valuable 'biophysical space' than they would be entitled to according to global average -then this country is obliged to accept more immigrants, until it reaches a point where its inhabitants are using these resources at the appropriate level (Risse 2012: Ch.8 ). Yet, beyond that, any private person can legitimately claim objects as theirs and any state can legitimately claim a territory as subject to its control.
The exclusive focus on the 'usefulness for human purposes of threedimensional spaces' (Risse 2015: 91) thus leaves the Grotian framework prone to overlook -or unable to theorise -the ways in which we relate to each other independently or at least derivatively of how each our respective holdings contributes to our needs satisfaction. 5 In putting at the centre stage 'our relationship with the planet as a whole' (Risse 2013: 11) rather than our interactions with other individuals, it speaks to a way of theorising that reduces questions of global justice to questions of legitimate distribution.
This leaves us with an impoverished and overly limited vision of global
relations -a vision that is not only immanent to the Grotian framework, but also dominant in the contemporary global justice literature. What I am after, instead, is a non-parochial standpoint that actually enables us to find mutually justifiable solutions for shared problems. This requires, to put it in Risse's (2012: x) own words, that we take global theorising seriously as a genuinely 'philosophical problem'. It is with this aim in mind that I turn to Kant.
Kant on original common possession
In the last section, I introduced Grotius's notion of original common ownership and raised some doubts regarding its suitability to serve as a truly global standpoint of justification. Now, at first sight it is not clear at all why and how Kant's superficially similar concept should do any better in and cannot be based on principles but only on history' (DoR 6:258 First, the kind of possession he has in mind is not ownership in the sense of private property (something which I can claim as mine regardless of whether I am physically connected to it), but mere physical possession or occupation. Hence, he is not referring to land in the sense of a fenced-in plot of territory -described as 'residence (sedes), a chosen and therefore an acquired lasting possession' -but merely as 'habitable ground' (DoR 6:261).
Second and more importantly, Kant hastens to add that this kind of possession is a 'possession in common' (DoR 6:262) . This is the case, we are told, because the spherical surface of the earth unites all places on its surface, for if its surface were an unbounded plane, people could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any community with one another, and community would not then be a necessary result of their existence on the earth. (DoR 6:262)
Two aspects of this puzzling line of argument are striking. First, while Kant articulates a concern that arises from human beings' embodied nature, this concern seems to be very different to that of Grotius: Kant's concern is with the kind of systematic interdependence relations that persist among embodied agents just in virtue of the fact that they act and coexist in finite space. Such agents of course need to be somewhere -they need a place on earth in order to act at all. Yet, they are very different from ( 
Disjunctive judgment and original community
In the last section, we got a first impression of Kant's conception of original common possession as laid out in the context of One of these forms of judgment is the 'disjunctive judgment', the exclusionary 'either…or' (CPR A73/B99). In a disjunctive judgment one divides a concept A into its mutually exclusive specifications B, C, and D.
The assertion of any of these specifications of A is then considered a sufficient condition for negating the others (if A is B, it cannot be C or D), and conversely the negation of all but one is a sufficient condition for asserting the remaining one. What is important to understand here is that the disjunctive form of judgment divides a logical space (the extension of a concept) into mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive spheres. The known constituents mutually exclude each other (they are logically opposed to one another) but together exhaust all of the logical possibility, i.e. they 'determine in their totality the true knowledge' (CPR A74, see also Watkins 2011: 44). Thus, there is a sense in which the state of each is bound to the others: the affirmation of one member implies the negation of the others, and the negation of all members but one implies the affirmation of the remaining member. A disjunctive judgement, that is to say, relates all concept subordination to a unified logical space within which concepts reciprocally delimit each other's sphere and meaning.
As already mentioned, the logical forms of judgment then ground categories or 'pure concepts of the understanding'. The idea is that the same acts of mind that generate the forms of judgment also generate the synthesis of spatiotemporal manifolds under concepts. 9 The disjunctive 9 It is perennially contested among interpreters what kind of connection between forms of judgment and categories Kant has exactly in mind there. Longuenesse (2005: 194ff) . emphasises that in order to avoid the Leibnizean rationalism that he rejects in the 'Amphiboly' section, Kant cannot assimilate a logical relation between concepts and a material relation between things. Watkins (2005) agrees that when Kant talks about 'the same procedure of the understanding' (CPR B113) that underlies judgment and the use of categories, he does not in any straightforward way derive one from the other but merely points out a similarity among the respective mental acts.
judgment yields the category of 'community' as the third category of 'relation', alongside 'substance' and 'causality' (CPR A80/B106, B110-11). Just as in a disjunctive judgment, the argument goes, a concept is divided up into its constituent components (bringing them into a relation of mutual determination and exclusion), so in a material whole, things mutually determine one another in an object or body considered as a whole (CPR B112/3). In both, members are represented as reciprocally coordinated with one another as parts that come together to constitute a whole. Just as two logically opposing propositions exclude each other, so two objects cannot occupy the same spatial position (at the same time). And just as the constituents of a disjunctive judgment, taken together, include the entire sphere of knowledge in that particular domain, so substances, in order to be an object of experience, must stand in a unified space, a whole that is the product of its various constituents. Consequently, the category of community has two names: 'Reciprocity' (with an emphasis is on the relation of causal interaction) and 'Community' (with an the emphasis on objects' being part of one space).
In order to elucidate this surprising connection that Kant stipulates, between the understanding's representation of relations among concepts and empirically given things in space, we need to have a closer look at the first Critique's section on the 'Analogies' (CPR A 177-218, B 218-265). There, Kant tries to show how precisely the categories of relation provide the human understanding with 'schemata' through which we synthesize the manifold of appearances into an intelligible horizon of spatiotemporality.
Each Analogy looks into how a specific category constitutes the condition of a particular type of temporal experience. In the third Analogy (CPR A211/B257), Kant claims that we can only experience appearances as coexisting simultaneously by applying the concept of community. 10 This, in turn, is to suppose that the objects are in relations of mutual interaction -they 'reciprocally contain the ground of the determination' of the other (CPR B258).
But why would that be the case? It seems that I can just look at my chair, then look at the table standing next to it and I simply know without further ado that they co-exist simultaneously. Yet, Kant does not think it is that easy, for while we always apprehend objects successively (we see one object first, then the other) we have no given (absolute) temporal framework within which we might locate events and states of affairs in time. Hence, we need the help of the categories that relate the perception of as a disjunctive judgement relates mutually exclusive concepts to a unified logical space, so the idea of a disjunctive community elucidates how in virtue of sharing the earth in common, we each affect one another. Yet, in order to fully exploit and appreciate the significance of the notion of disjunction and the pertinent category, we have to go a step further.
Following Beatrice Longuenesse (1998 Longuenesse ( : 375-394, 2005 1989: 9) . To use one's reason 'means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason' (WOT 8:146 fn.). One of the core principles of enlightenment, Kant repeatedly tells us, is to think for oneself while also 'putting [oneself] into the standpoint of others' (CJ 5:295). 13 Importantly, to reflect on one's own judgment from such a universal standpoint does not mean to take up some Archimedean view 'from nowhere' -a standpoint that is, from the perspective of Kant's critical philosophy, constitutively unavailable and philosophically futile. It means, instead, to shift one's own ground to the standpoint of the others and make it accessible and thus 12 Here I follow Milstein (2013: 124) . 13 In a similar vein we can read Kant's invocation of a genuine public use of reason as seeking to address all 'citizens of the world' (WOT 8:37). We saw Kant turning this sequence upside down: he starts from the insight into the conundrum of original acquisition of land, from which the need to think of the earth as possessed in common follows as a normative implication (Flikschuh 2000: 168) . The reason original acquisition of land does pose a conundrum for Kant is that, despite the fact that we cannot be blamed for the 'sheer facticity of our placement, willy-nilly, on the surface of the earth' (Shell 1996: 150) , it is not without normative consequences. For, given that the earth's spherical surface makes it physically impossible for human beings to get out of each other's ways once and for all, where and how we pursue our ends necessarily impacts where and how others can do so -quite simply because the space we take up at every particular point in What Kant seems to argue in these passages is that the global community arising from the unavoidable conditions of our existence on earth has some kind of priority over contingent, man-made communities of right-holders or co-owners linked by juridical relations. Of course, he is not suggesting that we should do away with all kinds of particular relations, commitments and institutions. 17 Rather, original common possession is normatively primordial in the sense that even under conditions where they are members of separate political communities, 'participants still remain "originally" participants in "commercium" to the extent that they still retain the reflexive capacities to build upon, critique, or revise the terms on which they coexist and interact with one another' (Milstein 2013: 125) . What motivates Kant's inversion of the sequence of Grotius's argument is precisely the latter's tendency to obliterate the global standpoint by essentially consolidating existing holdings and borders rather than questioning them. Kant's own model, in contrast, is supposed to provide a standpoint from which we can critically reflect on relations of property, territory or sovereignty that we have inherited. It allows us to ask in how far existing institutions affirm our ability to think ourselves as joint makers of the world around us -most importantly, by allowing us to recognize their own contingency such that we can take ownership of them -or whether they curtail this ability by delimiting possible interaction as well as entrenching and naturalising existing separations. To sum up, Kant's global standpoint allows individuals to see themselves as agents of justice that can collectively structure and transform their shared social world rather than putting up with those terms of interaction that they find themselves in.
Conclusion
In a recent 'progress report ', Samuel Scheffler (2014) inventory into a confession to conceptual and theoretical stasis in the pertinent debates. The aim of this article was to offer a fundamentally different and more systematic way of global theorising, which I take to be embodied in Kant's notion of original common possession. The contrast I developed with Grotius's related notion was not only supposed to illustrate Kant's departure from the natural law tradition, but also how much current debates are still caught up in a way of thinking that tends to reduce questions of global concern to questions of how to divide the world up. The main Kantian challenge to this framework arises from the change in perspective from which we think globally: away from the Archimedean observer that distributes global shares, to a reflexive first-personal standpoint through which agents recognise their unavoidable interdependence. This global standpoint does not come with ready-made solutions to shared global problems, but provides an alternative perspective from which to theorise and negotiate them. What is most appealing about the Kantian outlook is its unique and interesting way of framing the question how individuals relate to one another globally -emanating from a shift in the perspective from which this question arises in the first place.
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